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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that affect the creation of 
new firms in Latin American countries. We take into consideration economic, 
political, social and technological factors which should also help governments 
realize the areas that we found to have the greatest impact. The study relies 
on data from international organizations from which we construct an Ordered 
Probit model. The results indicate that credit and government effectiveness 
enhance the probability of generating new business but it depended of 
business density. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The scholarly community is in disagreement regarding the benefits of new business to 
an economy. Research in the 1970s found that small firms contribute a disproportionate 
amount of new jobs (Evans et al. 1989c). Similarly, Haitwanger, Jarmin and Miranda 
(Haltiwanger et al. 2008) found that start-ups and young businesses were critical for job 
creation and contributed significantly to a country’s net growth. In contrast, authors 
like Shane  (Shane 2009) have argued that start-ups are not innovative, create few jobs 
and generate little wealth. Likewise, a World Bank report (Ayyagari et al. 2011), while 
recognizing the economic benefits of new firms and indicating that young firms 
contributed to employment, noted that they were not as productive as their larger 
counterparts. The same report, nonetheless, found that small, young firms contributed a 
greater amount of jobs than larger and more established firms. 
In spite of the contradictory evidence, governments have put forth significant efforts to 
support small and medium businesses (SMEs). In the United States, for example, the 
Small Business Act of 1953 mandated the establishment of government-sponsored 
programs to take care of SMEs’ concerns and improve managerial skills (Lowrey 2004). 
For other nations, SMEs in general, and new businesses in particular, are relatively new 
policy priorities. 
It is well known among the general public that new businesses have a high failure rate; 
however, a fraction of them will succeed and grow into companies that will positively 
affect an economy. We thus believe that establishing conditions that foster the entry of 
new business can benefit a country. For this reason, in this paper, we wish to determine 
the impact that political, economic, social and technological factors have on the 
development of new businesses. 
This paper is organized as follows. A literature review on the main factors that explain 
the formation of new companies is presented in the second section. In the third section 
the methodology of the regression model and the data used is exposed. The fourth 
section presents the results and interpretation of the estimates. Finally, we conclude in 
the fifth section. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The way new firms affect an economy depends on the socioeconomic and political 
circumstances they face. These, which altogether we call institutions, determine where 
individuals put their resources. These can be productive, unproductive or destructive 
activities, depending on the incentives they face (North 1990).  
The term institutional risks, for the purpose of this paper, refers to the “rules of the 
game,” the laws and regulations that govern economic activity, along with political and 
social relationships (North 1990; Scott 2001). These regulations provide incentives as 
well as constraints to investment. They affect transactions costs and information flows 
(Chan et al. 2008). There is evidence of the positive and negative impacts that 
differences in attributes such as access to inputs of production, competitive advantage, 
technology and the country’s institutions can have on the private sector (Chan et al. 
2008). 
There are four factors that can affect the capabilities of entrepreneurs to engage in 
innovation. These are a country’s political institutions, its economic circumstances, its 
social factors (See table 1). 
 
Table 1: Main factors that explain the formation of new firms. 
Factors Description 
Governance 
Factors 
• Political institutions include laws and regulations, the processes that 
governments adopt to regulate economic activity and the enforcement of 
these laws. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (Kaufmann et al. 2010) 
define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of 
the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; 
and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
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govern economic and social interactions among them” (p. 
• Government actions can positively or negatively affect the creation of 
new businesses. In many countries, governments have recognized the 
benefits of entrepreneurship and have set up programs that will support 
the creation of new enterprises. These programs include what we would 
term “getting out of the way” policies; these include industry 
privatization and liberalization, as well as simplification of regulatory 
requirements (Audretsch 2001), but there are also “helping hand” 
policies that include more targeted efforts to support entrepreneurial 
activity. These include, for example, favorable lending, favorable 
taxation, subsidies, and training. In this paper, we focus only on general 
governance factors—as opposed to targeted initiatives—that can affect 
companies’ incentives to enter the market. 
 
Economic 
Factors 
• Income: A country’s level of development affects individuals’ 
occupational decisions because it affects the demand and supply of labor 
(Banerjee et al. 1993a). Since wealth has an impact on one’s decision to 
become an entrepreneur, the distribution of wealth has an impact on 
entrepreneurship. According to Banerjee and Newman (Banerjee et al. 
1993a), in countries that have high income inequality, “[t]he process of 
development runs out of steam,” leading to little employment and low 
wages. The opposite is also true—when income inequality is low, the 
economy will grow, leading to high wages and a high employment rate 
(Banerjee et al. 1993b). 
• Access to credit: Well-developed financial institutions and access to 
credit enhance entrepreneurial activity in a country (Aidis et al. 2008). 
Consequently, several studies have found that a lack of credit is one of 
the major constraints to those wishing to start a new business (Beck et 
al. 2008; Beck et al. 2005; Storey 1994). This problem is particularly 
severe for small firms (De Mel et al. 2011), due to several significant 
impediments: They experience higher risks because of their lack of a 
credit history,  have a high failure rate, and require greater monitoring 
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costs Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2011; Elston & Audretsch, 2011). These 
factors are exacerbated when a country also has a weak legal and 
financial system that has not developed the means to provide credit to 
these smaller entities. 
• Competition from abroad: National boundaries separate countries’ 
economic policies and institutions. Within these boundaries, 
governments tend to implement policies to protect their economies 
(Olson, 1996). It is therefore not unusual to find policies restricting 
trade across markets (Busenitz et al., 2000) or bureaucratic procedures 
that erect barriers to foreign investors (Banga). Through trade 
agreements, governments can regulate commerce and find new 
opportunities for entrepreneurs beyond their borders (Olson Jr 1996).  
Social 
Factors 
• Education: the human infrastructure of a country refers to the pool of 
skills available in the population that can be hired for productive 
activities (Chan et al. 2008). Schooling is acknowledged not only for its 
productive effect on the quality or quantity of labor supplied, as is 
assumed by Mincer, but also for its role as a signal of productive ability 
in labor markets without complete information (Spence 1973).  
• Empirical evidence shows that education was the most important factor 
for new firm creation in the period 1976-1989 (Christensen 1993). Le 
(Le) similarly argues that there are several channels through which one’s 
level of education might influence the propensity to become self-
employed. Calvo and Wellisz (Calvo et al.), inspired by Lucas’ general 
equilibrium model (1978), explain the impact of one’s educational 
attainment on the probability of selecting an entrepreneurial position, 
given managerial ability. This means that education can enhance 
managerial ability, which in turn increases the probability of 
entrepreneurship. 
Source: The authors. 
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3. REGRESSION MODEL AND DATA 
The dependent variable new business density (DNBRDENS) is heterogeneous across 
countries. Thus, we can observe that the sample contains some countries with a low 
density of start-ups; another part of the sample has an average density; and yet another 
set of countries experiences a high number of new businesses registered. Intuitively, we 
can think of the business density as a latent variable ordered into three different types 
of countries: those with low, medium and high-density business creation. 
More formally, consider the observed categorical variable new business density with a 
latent density status by country DNBRDENS (i,t). Let DNBRDENS be the ordered 
categories, DNBRDENS  J 	 
1,2,3 where each number in J denotes one of the 
categories for the business creation variable. For independent and identically 
distributed (iid), let DNBRDENS for  	 1, … ,  observations (i denotes cross-sectional 
units, and t the time dimension of the data panel) be a nominal variable representing 
the ordered categories  	 1, … , . 
 
The latent variable is tied to the (observed) ordered variable DNBRDENS, by the 
observation rule: 
 
DNBRDENS, 	  if   DNBRDENS,  ,  	 1, … ,  
    
where thresholds  are strictly increasing     for all κ.  
 
The structure of our data set allows us to use an ordered probit panel data 
methodology This type of analysis can control for heterogeneity across countries and 
reduce collinearity among the selected variables (Arellano et al. 1990). Our ordered 
probit panel data model may be represented as follows: 
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DNBRDENS, 	 x
 β"ε,;  $ 	 1 … . & ;  	 1 … .       (1) 
 
The cumulative probabilities for the DNBRDENS (i,t) are then related to a set of 
explanatory variables, x, which is affected by political, social and economic; these are 
determined by the following equation: 
 
'()DNBRDENS,  *|,- 	 ./0 1 , 23 * 	 1,2,3 
 
The function F represents a accumulative standard normal distribution, resulting in an 
ordered Probit model. Including the latent variable in this model, we have 
 
DNBRDENS 	 j if and only if 05  DNBRDENS 	 , 2"ε,  0  * 	 1, . .3 
 
This equation means that the thresholds divide the linear slope DNBRDENS into J 
categories. Moreover, different factors (observable and unobservable) influence the 
latent variables density of business creation, where ε, $ 	 1 … . & represents the 
composite errors. For each t, ε is the sum of unobserved effects and an idiosyncratic 
error. This error term, ε , is iid across countries and over time, where 7ε|,8 	 0, for i 
= +100 countries, and T = 11 years. For this error, we assume a zero mean and a 
constant variance, e.g., :; 	 1. 
The probability that a country will report a business density status to be in J = {1,2,3} 
is expressed in the next equation: 
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'()DNBRDENS, 	 *|,- 	 ./0 1 , 23 1 ./05 1 , 23  .  (2) 
 
Note that we have a vector β, which is presumed to be the same for all categories (one 
obstacle to the appropriate implementation of an ordered probit is the parallel lines 
assumption). This means that with the increase of an independent variable, the 
accumulated distribution shifts to the right or left, but there is no shift in the slope of 
the distribution. Greene et al. (2008) suggest that in a set of thresholds, individual 
variation that appears in the data is an indicator for heterogeneity. Thus, allowing the 
indices to differ across the outcomes leads to a generalized ordered probit model.  
 
0 	 <= " ,
 >0         (3) 
 
where >0are the influence parameter of the covariates on the thresholds. Entering (3) in 
(2), we have the generalized ordered probit model (4): 
 
Pr DNBRDENS,  *|, 	 ./<= " ,
 >0 1 , 23 	 ./<= 1 ,A203   (4) 
 
In (3), the threshold coefficients cannot be identified separately for this system of 
vectors x. Note that in (4), 20 	 2 1 >0,  ,A20  identifies one index for each category j of 
the outcome variable. Thus, we have a generalized ordered probit model with J-1 
binary probit models.   The last equation allows heterogeneity across the categories of 
the business density variable.  
We will define a nonlinear model  
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./Pr 7DNBRDENS,B,, ,;, … , ,C3 	 D7DNBRDENS,, 2 ,E " 0 " θ8  (5) 
 
where θ is a vector of ancillary parameters  and captures an overdispersion  in the 
threshold parameters in an ordered probit model. 
A random-effects ordered probit relaxes this assumption and allows the effects of the 
explanatory variables to vary with each of the ordinal dependent variables.  
For panel data, individual heterogeneity is accounted for by using a random-effects 
generalized ordered probit approach (Arellano et al. 1995).  In this case, we find that 
the outcome probabilities are conditional on the individual effect F. 
 
Pr DNBRDENS, 	 1|,E , F 	 . 1 x
 β 1 F 
 
Pr DNBRDENS, 	 2|,E , F 	 . 1 x
 β; 1 F 1 . 1 x
 β 1 F   (6) 
 
Pr DNBRDENS, 	 3|,E , F 	 . 1 x
 βG 1 F 1 . 1 x
 β; 1 F  
 
The random-effects generalized ordered probit model uses the standard normal as the 
accumulative distribution. The individual effects are presumed to be normally 
distributed, with zero mean and variance :;.  
Using panel data allows the inclusion of two kinds of heterogeneity. The first is 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, which is captured by a random-effects 
specification. The second results from differences in the beta coefficients represent the 
observed heterogeneity in the reporting of the categories for DNBRDENS.  
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In this system, we do not have explicit solutions for the parameter estimates, and they 
must, therefore, be solved iteratively. To find the solution of the model, we need to 
construct a maximum likelihood the estimator, a parametric approach to modeling. 
First, the density is presumed to be fully defined. In equation (7), we have a likelihood 
function for a sample of N observations:  
 
 L  =  ,'( ,)(11 iitit
DNBRDENSg
iT
t
N
i α+∏∏ == xβ θ).  (7) 
 
The likelihood equations are  
 0=∂
∂
β
Llog
,   
log
0, 1,...,
L
i N
iα
∂
= =
∂ ,   
log
0
L∂
=
∂θ , 
 
The likelihood contribution for each cross-sectional unit was approximated using a 
Gauss – Hermite quadrature. 
The final model is presented in equation (8) 
 
DNBRDENS, 	 αI " αJKLM " α;NO$P " αGDP " αQ$(RJPSLL " αTS$UP($R,PM "
αVDDOKP"ε, (8) 
 
Where:  
 
DNBRDENS  J 	 
1,2,3 , where each number in J denotes one of the categories for the 
business creation variable. 
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dcps :  Domestic credit to private sector percent of GDP, refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases 
of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, 
which establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims 
include credit to public enterprises. 
lfte:  Labor force with tertiary education, this is the proportion of the labor 
force that has a tertiary education, expressed as a percentage of the total 
labor force. 
ge:  Government effectiveness: This variable captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of 
its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. The estimate gives the country's score as an aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
tradeopp: The trade-to-GDP ratio is frequently used to measure the importance of 
international transactions relative to domestic transactions. This indicator 
is calculated for each country as the simple average (i.e. the mean) of 
total trade (i.e. the sum of exports and imports of goods and services) 
relative to GDP. 
othertaxes:  Other taxes include employer payroll or labor taxes, taxes on property, 
and taxes not allocable to other categories, such as penalties for late 
payment or nonpayment of taxes. 
ggfce:  The variable general government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation 
of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and 
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security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. 
 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
As was indicated before, we estimated the model using a random-effects generalized 
ordered probit. The ordered dependent categorical variables are associated with 
business density, a three-level variable where 1 represents very low-density business 
creation (countries that fall within the lowest 25th percentile) and 3 represents high-
density business creation (countries above the 75th percentile). As explanatory 
variables, we included a set of social, economic, political and technological capabilities. 
For each of these four factors, we collected more data than appear in the model, 
because in constructing it we found significant correlations among variables that 
measure similar factors. 
Table 1 shows the marginal effects which quantify the variation in the estimated 
probability to a marginal change in the independent variable. In this case, the marginal 
effects measures the changes in the probability that a country experiences when the 
independent variable changes for each of the three country types. 
The model includes two economic variables: the “domestic credit available to the 
private sector” and the trade openness. For the first variable increase of 1% of domestic 
credit reduce the medium business density likelihood and increase in 2.9 perceptual 
points the likelihood to find high business density. This means that the availability of 
domestic private sector credit decreases the probability of having a low density of 
business creation and increases the probability of having a medium and high new 
business density. For trade openness variable which was not significant for any of the 
thresholds. Understanding this will require further research by the academic community 
because it contradicts previous studies’ suggestions regarding the trade and its effects 
on new business creation.  
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Variables 
Low 
Business 
Density 
Medium Business 
density 
High Business 
density 
Domestic Credit to 
private sector 
-9.068 
(8.744) 
-19.982** 
(1.0204) 
2.9051*** 
(0.8196) 
Labor Force with tertiary 
education 
-1.5898 
(4.5412) 
0.5025 
1.428 
1.0874 
.0031176 
Government effectiveness 
-
22.2775*** 
(9.1495) 
7.0406** 
(3.2736) 
15.237*** 
(6.2898) 
Trade Openness 
-1.777 
(3.991) 
0.0561 
(0.1259) 
0.1215 
(0.2739) 
Taxes 
18.9157*** 
(0.64834) 
-41.8829*** 
(0.067233) 
22.9671** 
(0.53946) 
General Government 
Final Consumption 
-
10.6688*** 
3.0649 
3.3718*** 
1.2159 
7.297*** 
2.118 
Number observations 300 
Wald Chi2(8) 49.81 
Wald test of parallel lines 
assumption for the final 
model: 
4,35 – Pvalue: 0.3610 
NOTES; dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses 
(Delta Method) ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 1: Average marginal effects after the random-effects ordered probit 
 
Of the social variables, we included only the labor force with tertiary education. The 
rationale for this is consistent with the existing literature, which indicates that more 
educated individuals are more likely to start a business. Thus, we assume that countries 
where the labor force is more educated (i.e., having more individuals with a college 
degree) will be more entrepreneurial. The results do not support this hypothesis for all 
three thresholds and suggest that the probability of experiencing a higher rate of 
business creation increases does not depend of education. 
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The governance effectiveness and general government consumption were significant. 
Even though we wanted to capture the complexity of bureaucracies with these and 
similar variables, we suspect that new companies are not yet large enough to 
governance effectiveness. Thus perceptions of the quality of public services and the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure 
affect positively the likelihood to find medium and high business density. We obtain the 
same result for the general government consumption. 
The tax rate is statistically significant for all three density thresholds of 
entrepreneurship. Thus, increases in this index increase the likelihood of having a low 
density of business creation and increase the likelihood of having a medium and high 
density.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this document we wished to determine the impact that political, economic, social and 
technological factors have on the development of new businesses. As could be expected, 
different countries have different governance, economic, political, social circumstances. 
In our case, we only make a distinction among three different types of countries: those 
that have low, medium and high business entry. Countries that experience low business 
entry can reduce the probability of being in this situation by government effectiveness, 
domestic credit and government consumption. On the other hand, the governance 
effectiveness, taxes and credit increase the probability of maintaining that standing, and 
for countries in the high business entry group.  
In regard to the economic factors, we found no conclusive effect of trade openness on 
business creation; but while the results indicate trade does not play a role, access to 
credit matters. This shows that even if we have a low-income country, we can still see 
business being created if there is access to credit.  
Further research will be necessary to analyze these data at a higher level of granularity. 
For example, they could be explored by income level and by region. 
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We hope that this research provides some guidelines for governments regarding their 
decision to invest in the country when the desire is to generate economic activity. 
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